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Abstract The aim of this study is to investigate the value-adding role of corporate
monitoring and corporate involvement in ‘sticky’ inter-subsidiary innovation
transfer environments. The value added role of these two managerial approaches is
viewed in terms of their impact on innovation transfer efficiency and effectiveness.
Based on the network view of the MNC, our research builds on the notion that the
corporate headquarters (CHQ) is ill-informed and may suffer from a radical
uncertainty about what it actually knows and needs to know. By using a data sample
containing 87 innovation transfer projects in 25 multinational companies, we test six
sets of hypotheses. Overall, our findings show that the value added of CHQ mon-
itoring as well as an active CHQ involvement is considerably constrained. However,
contrary to our expectations, the results show that CHQ monitoring gives rise to an
increase in both transfer efficiency and effectiveness when the ‘stickiness’ is based
on tangible resource constraints. The results imply that when it comes to CHQ
involvement during the innovation transfer processes, the choice between a hands-
off and a hands-on approach has to be understood in the light of the CHQ’s
knowledge situation.
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Scholars have long been concerned with the role of the corporate headquarters
(CHQ), particularly in the context of diversified and differentiated multinational
companies (MNCs) (Chandler 1962, 1991; Penrose 1959). Past research confirms
that the management of important value-creating activities occurring at the
subsidiary level, such as the transfer of knowledge and innovations, is crucial for
the competitiveness of modern MNCs (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Forsgren and
Holm 2010; Hedlund 1986). However, several scholars propose that we still lack an
understanding of to what extent and under what conditions the CHQ actually
contributes to and add value to such activities (Ambos and Mahnke 2010;
Chiabuschi et al. 2012a; Egelhoff 2010; Tallman and Koza 2010).
In the literature, two basic but rather contrasting roles or managerial approaches
of the CHQ have been discussed. The first so called ‘monitoring’ role (cf. Foss
1997), emphasizes that main task of the CHQ is to work against opportunistic
behavior (Williamson 1975) and to provide incentives toward common organiza-
tional goals. The dominant research has been on this monitoring role of the CHQ
(see detailed analysis by Foss 1997) and the issue of whether the CHQ should use a
hands-off strategy in terms of different means of supervision (cf. Alfoldi et al. 2012;
Bjo¨rkman et al. 2004). In contrast to this loss preventing role of the CHQ (e.g.,
Chandler 1991; Foss 1997), another stream of research emphasizes that the CHQ
should have a more active and value adding role (Ambos and Mahnke 2010;
Chandler 1991; Collis et al. 2007; Egelhoff 2010; Foss 1997; Foss et al. 2012). This
would include responsibilities such as the facilitation of organizational learning and
knowledge transfer, which implies the CHQ as an active participant in value-
creating processes at the subsidiary level (Forsgren and Holm 2010). Hence, a more
recent stream of research emphasizes how an actual hands-on strategy by the CHQ
is necessary (Goold and Campbell 2002; Goold et al. 1998) and suggests a more
active involvement of the CHQ in subsidiary level activities (Ciabuschi et al. 2012b;
Egelhoff 2010; Yamin et al. 2011).
There is little doubt in the literature that the CHQ is motivated to add value to the
overall MNC network and is perceived as such by other units in the MNC
(Anderson and Holm 2010; Ciabuschi et al. 2012a; Egelhoff 2010). However, recent
research emphasizes the notion of the headquarters’ ‘knowledge situation’ in
network-like MNCs (cf. Forsgren and Holm 2010) in which the value added of the
CHQ’s managerial efforts has been questioned (Alfoldi et al. 2012). In the received
literature on the network MNC it has been suggested that the CHQ has a limited
access to relevant knowledge that are useful for subsidiary level activities. This
implies that the CHQ is rather ill-informed (Foss et al. 2012) and consequently may
suffer from behavioral liabilities such as an ‘‘outsidership’’ (Johanson and Vahlne
2009; Vahlne et al. 2012), a ‘‘radical uncertainty’’ about what it actually knows and
what it needs to know (Forsgren and Holm 2010; Chiabuschi et al. 2011; Tsoukas
1996), and a liability of reliability (Verbeke and Greidanus 2009). Such managerial
liabilities may give rise to managerial errors not only in terms of the implementation
of badly designed supervision but also poorly developed value added participation
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(Forsgren and Holm 2010; Foss et al. 2012). Hence, from this perspective it can be
expected that the opportunities for the CHQ to add value to innovation processes
may be considerably constrained.
Due to CHQs lack of appropriate knowledge to involve themselves in transfer
activities at the subsidiary level (Forsgren et al. 2005; Chiabushi et al. 2012b), it has
been suggested that there is a need for research on how such liabilities may have an
impact on such activities (cf. Foss et al. 2012). There has also been a call among
International Business (IB) scholars for investigations to enhance our understanding
about the particular circumstances under which the CHQ can add value to
innovation transfer processes within MNCs (cf. Miao et al. 2016; Dellestrand and
Kappen 2012). This paper contributes to these calls and enrich the literature by
developing a framework that incorporates aspects of the ‘knowledge situation’ of
CHQ to shed light on the value added role of CHQ management in innovation
transfer processes, in particular under ‘‘sticky’’ transfer conditions.
Innovation transfer processes often become problematic and ‘‘sticky’’ due to the
occurrence of a variety of transfer constraints (e.g., Simonin 1999). In this paper
these constraints are categorized into three broad categories; knowledge-related
constraints, contextual constraints, and resource-related constraints. Not only has
much of the received research failed to simultaneously examine all of these
antecedents, the role of the headquarters in transfer processes is lacking a deeper
understanding (Chung 2014). Hence, the research question is: What is the value
added role of CHQ monitoring and CHQ involvement in ‘sticky’ inter-subsidiary
innovation transfer processes? For the simplicity of the paper, the value added of
these two managerial approaches is viewed in terms of its’ impact on the
performance of the innovation transfer processes. A distinction is made between
transfer efficiency and transfer effectiveness (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995;
Ciabuschi et al. 2012b; Pe´rez-Nordtvedt et al. 2008, 2015). The transfer efficiency
relates to the actual transfer process in terms of the costs and the speed of the
process (cf. Szulanski 1996; Teece 1977; Zander and Kogut 1995), whereas the
transfer effectiveness is related to the level of completion and the satisfaction of the
transfer process (Kostova 1999; Kostova and Roth 2002).
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the conceptual
framework and the relating hypotheses. First we present the issue of sticky transfer
processes, after which we discuss the role of the CHQ and its knowledge situation in
network MNCs. After that we develop a set of hypotheses on the value added of
CHQ monitoring and CHQ involvement in transfer processes in situations where the
transfer process is constrained by knowledge- contextual- and resource related
barriers. The next section presents the method, including our research design, the
data collection, the sample, and the operationalization of variables. In the following
section we present the results of the OLS regression analysis. In the final section, a
concluding discussion is presented including implications for management and
future research.
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2 Sticky Innovation Transfer Processes
The literature on knowledge transfer varies in how knowledge transfer has been
conceptualized. One stream of literature presents knowledge transfer as a linear,
mechanical process in which knowledge is relocated and added to the knowledge-
base of another actor (Kogut and Zander 1992; Spender 1996). Another stream of
research puts emphasis on knowledge transfer as a highly complex and interactive
process dependent on the beliefs, values and circumstances of the actors involved in
this process (Nonaka 1994). Recently, considerable knowledge transfer research has
adopted a source and a recipient model (Ko et al. 2014; Patriotta et al. 2013). From
this perspective, knowledge transfer is viewed as a dyadic exchange between a
source and a receiving unit involved in a transfer event. This is similar to Szulanski
(1996, p. 28) stating that knowledge transfer is to be considered as ‘‘dyadic
exchanges of organizational knowledge between a source and a recipient unit’’. In
line with these views, we adopt the notion of knowledge transfer as a transfer
process that takes place between senders and receivers within an MNC. The paper is
specifically concerned with inter-subsidiary knowledge transfer where a subsidiary
(the sender) transfers an innovation developed by the subsidiary to another
subsidiary (the receiver) within the MNC. The transfer is thus viewed as a dyadic,
targeted and deliberate process between a source and a receiving unit involved in a
transfer event (Patriotta et al. 2013). Furthermore, the transfer process involves
transfer of subsidiary generated innovations, where ‘innovation’ implies the result
of the technological development by a firm or as a result of the combination of the
firm’s existing technologies and know-how in a novel way (Teece 1986). Hence, in
this study innovation transfer is viewed as a specific knowledge transfer process. In
the following, knowledge transfer and innovation transfer will be used
interchangeably.
In general, knowledge transfer processes are often viewed as ‘‘sticky’’ simply
because they often encounter a number of different constraints, e.g., barriers, and
knowledge is therefore not readily or easily transferred (Szulanski 2003). Past
research has covered several constraining conditions to knowledge transfer which
has been categorized into the following categories; knowledge-related constraints,
contextual constraints, and resource-related constraints. The knowledge related
constraints refer to the nature, attributes, and complexity of the knowledge itself
(Grant 1996a; Hansen 1999; Spender 1996; Szulanski 1996, 2000; Winter 1987;
Zander and Kogut 1995). For instance, the nature of knowledge, such as the inherent
level of tacitness, specificity, and complexity, are factors that result in knowledge
ambiguity (Reed and DeFillipi 1990; Simonin 1999; van Wijk et al. 2008).
Knowledge ambiguity concerns the uncertainty of what the underlying knowledge
components are and how they interact. It has been argued that learning about the
‘‘specifics of the knowledge source takes time and constrains the ultimate success of
the transfer process’’ (van Wijk et al. 2008, p. 833). Furthermore several studies
provide evidence that knowledge ambiguity constrains transfer processes (Levin
and Cross 2004; Persson 2006; Szulanski et al. 2004) and is directly and negatively
related to knowledge flow performance (Simonin 1999).
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The contextual constraints refer to problems related to the situation in which the
transfer occurs (Simonin 1999; Szulanski 1996). According to Postrel (2002)
knowledge inputs are embedded in a cognitive, behavioral, or organizational
context. This context not only constrains the actual transfer process but also the
usefulness of the knowledge in different situations (van Wijk et al. 2008). The
contextual barriers include technical and organizational differences (Allen 1977;
Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Szulanski 1996) as well as more cognitive aspects such
as the cognitive resistance by the recipients to accept external knowledge (Katz and
Allen 1982; Lichtenthaler and Ernst 2006) or the resistance by the receivers to
engage in transfer due to potential loss of advantage within the MNC (e.g., the not-
invented-here syndrome). Resource-related constraints are to a large extent
connected to the tangible time, resources and efforts that can be put into the
transfer process (Lin et al. 2008). For instance, due to the lack of human as well as
financial resources to put into the process, both the sending and the receiving units
may face difficulties in engaging in the transfer process (Szulanski 1996; Forsgren
1997). The difficulties may rise both in terms of poor communication and relational
exchanges (Collins and Hitt 2006).
From the above established research it can be concluded that these conditions
create ‘sticky’ innovation transfer environments and have, in general, a restraining
effect on the overall innovation transfer processes (Persson 2006; Kang 2013). Due
to the extensive literature supporting a negative direct effect of the above mentioned
transfer constraints on knowledge transfer process in general, we will not elaborate
further on the direct effect of these transfer constraints on innovation transfer
processes.
2.1 The Value Added of CHQ in Innovation Transfer Processes—
A Network Approach
On an overarching level, the role of the CHQ has been described in terms of two
basic managerial approaches. Within the first one, the role of headquarters is
‘avoiding the negative’ (Foss 1997). This role implies the prevention of losses by
the use of monitoring (Williamson 1975). In line with transaction cost theory it is
asserted that CHQ can monitor and thus control other units in order to reduce
opportunistic behavior and to ensure the most efficient use of scarce resources
(Chandler 1962; Williamson 1985). A similar argument stems from agency theory
emphasizing that managers are self-serving and that monitoring and incentive
mechanisms can bring about goal equilibrium between CHQ and their dispersed
subsidiaries (Jensen and Meekling 1976; O’Donnell 2000). Hence, this view on the
role of the CHQ is based on the view of a ‘solver of agency problems’ (Foss 1997)
and constitutes a manifestation of headquarters power that have a tendency to
constrain the subsidiaries’ behavior (Ambos and Mahnke 2010). Overall, this
perspective suggests that barriers can easily be overcome through the exercise of
hierarchical control and minimal corporate involvement (Roth et al. 1991).
In contrast, the network perspective represents a shift in the view of the role of
CHQ from a supervisor to an organizer of learning and knowledge sharing within
and across units. A network MNC is characterized by a low degree of formalization,
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extensive knowledge transfer and resource-rich and powerful subsidiaries (Foss
et al. 2012; Forsgren et al. 2005). Research on the role of the CHQ within the
network tradition has resulted in the development of concepts such as corporate
parenting (Goold et al. 1998; Goold and Campbell 2002), headquarters attention
(Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008; Rugman and Verbeke 2001; Ambos and Mahnke
2010), and headquarters involvement (Ciabuschi et al. 2011, 2012b; Forsgren and
Holm 2010; Raab et al. 2014; Yamin et al. 2011). Within this stream of research an
active involvement of the headquarters is emphasized in terms of investments in
time, effort and resources in unit-level activities (Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008),
and a value-adding nature of corporate parenting (Goold et al. 1998; Egelhoff 2010).
For instance, literature dealing with parenting theory (cf. Goold et al. 1998; Goold
and Campbell 2002) suggests that there is a high likelihood of headquarters
involvement in subsidiary level activities and that such involvement leads to an
enhanced outcome of these processes. However, other network scholars propose that
actors in general have limited knowledge, limited control over resources and cannot
fully overview the behavior, intentions, and interactive processes of other actors
(Forsgren et al. 2005). Consequently, it is suggested that the CHQ’s knowledge
situation in the network MNC is reflected by an increasing complexity which may
result in managerial liabilities such as outsidership (Johanson and Vahlne 2009;
Vahlne et al. 2012), a liability of uncertainty (Ciabuschi et al. 2011, 2012b; Forsgren
and Holm 2010), and a liability of reliability (Verbeke and Greidanus 2009).
As for the liability of outsidership (Johanson and Vahlne 2009), this refers to the
CHQ’s lack of understanding of the subsidiaries’ local networks and contexts. It is
not until the headquarters is an ‘insider’, as the learning, trust and commitment
building can take place (Johanson and Vahlne 2009). Vahlne et al. (2012, p. 229)
argue that headquarter managers that face local contexts of which they have little or
no information ‘‘have to manage under a cloud of uncertainty and thus in an
atmosphere of goal ambiguity’’. This situation may become even more complicated
when the CHQ suffers from a liability of uncertainty (Ciabuschi et al. 2011;
Forsgren and Holm 2010; Foss et al. 2012; Vahlne et al. 2012) regarding the level,
relevance and usefulness of the knowledge it possesses about the subsidiaries and
their contexts in which the innovation processes take place. From an uncertainty
point of view (cf. Hayek 1945; Kirzner 1982), the key to achieving coordinated
transfer activities does not depend on ‘‘those ‘higher up’ collecting more and more
knowledge’’ (Tsoukas 1996, p. 22), but on knowing what to collect and how and
where to collect it (Andersson et al. 2007; Barner-Rasmussen et al. 2010). In line
with this argument, research proposes the idea and concept of ‘‘bounded reliability’’
(Verbeke and Greidanus 2009) suggesting that losses in efficiency and effectiveness
can be related to factors such as ‘intentional deceit’ and ‘over-commitment’. This
liability of reliability implies that CHQ often tend to make false or even break
promises about their commitment or make commitments based on impulsivity, i.e.,
without any deeper knowledge or insight (Verbeke and Greidanus 2009). This may
result in an overconfidence of its own role in a process or activity, rather than the
possession of accurate and reliable knowledge. Based on the above reasoning, there
is a high likelihood that subsidiaries perceive CHQ management as a bad cause
(Foss et al. 2012).
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The value added role of these two managerial approaches, e.g., CHQ
monitoring and CHQ involvement, is viewed in terms of its’ impact on the
actual performance of the transfer process. In much of the research on
knowledge transfer, the emphasis has been put on the flow of knowledge in
terms of the occurrence, frequency or degree of knowledge exchange rather than
the actual performance, e.g., the success of the transfer process. When
knowledge transfer is seen as ‘successful’, it involves a cheap, fast and
complete transfer process which also adds to the overall satisfaction (Inkpen
2000; Szulanski 1996). It is claimed that although the transfer process is fast, if
the knowledge is not perceived by the recipient as particularly relevant or easy
to understand, the transfer will not result in the desired outcomes (Pe´rez-
Nordtvedt et al. 2008). This is in line with scholars arguing that there is a need
to view the actual performance outcomes of transfer processes in terms of the
efficiency and the effectiveness of the knowledge transfer process (Yamin et al.
2011). Transfer efficiency relates to the cost and the speed of the actual transfer
project (cf. Pe´rez-Nordtvedt et al. 2008; Teece 1977; Zander and Kogut 1995;
Zahra et al. 2000). The transfer effectiveness is related to the level of
completion of a transfer project and to what extent it is used and implemented at
the receiving unit (Ambos and Ambos 2009; Kostova and Roth 2002; Raab et al.
2014). This is similar to the distinction made by Daft (1998, p. 663), where he
defines efficiency as ‘‘the amount of resources used to produce a unit of output’’
(e.g., time and cost) and effectiveness as ‘‘the degree to which goals are
attained’’ (i.e., to what extent the innovation is actually implemented within the
MNC). Hence, in line with the above distinction of innovation transfer
performance, the value added of ‘CHQ monitoring’ and ‘CHQ involvement’ is
considered to be reflected in the extent to which these two managerial
approaches contribute to innovation transfer effectiveness and efficiency.
2.2 CHQ Monitoring in Sticky Transfer Environments
It has been argued that the ability of the CHQ to use hierarchy decreases in network-
like organizations (Forsgren et al. 2005). Furthermore, the opportunities for the
CHQ to add value to innovation processes at the subsidiary level through
monitoring are severely constrained in a situation of radical uncertainty (Forsgren
and Holm 2010). The reason for this is that the CHQ in network MNCs are often ill-
informed due to ‘sheer ignorance’ (Ciabuschi et al. 2011), which will give rise to
managerial errors in decision making (cf. Foss et al. 2012).
When transfer processes are constrained by high ambiguity of the inherent
knowledge components of the innovation, the extent to which the CHQ can add
value to these processes is highly dependent on its ability to provide relevant
expertise, equipment and facilities to overcome this knowledge ambiguity. If the
CHQ uses monitoring, where the CHQ imposes a distant role as an ‘outsider’ in
relation to the transfer processes, it may find it hard to identify the sources of the
knowledge ambiguity faced by the participating subsidiaries. In other words, the
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CHQ may have difficulty in estimating ex ante what knowledge is needed to
overcome the knowledge ambiguity. When the knowledge provided by the CHQ is
perceived as limited in terms of its relevance and usefulness, this may only lead to
confusion and demotivation may slow down the transfer process. Furthermore, if the
corporate parent only contributes to local subsidiary activities from a distance, it
only operates in ‘alien territory’ (Campbell et al. 1995) and the subsidiaries may
face a lack of leadership and guidance regarding the focal innovation which will put
constraints on the overall satisfaction with the process.
Hypothesis 1a–b: The effect of knowledge ambiguity on (a) innovation transfer
efficiency and (b) innovation transfer effectiveness is negatively moderated by
CHQ monitoring.
During transfer processes, contextual constraints often arise due to e.g., technical
or organizational differences (Allen 1977; Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Szulanski
1996) as well as cognitive resistance among the senders and recipients. In such
circumstances, a high level of corporate involvement has been proposed to be
necessary (Chiabuschi et al. 2012b). However, the CHQ’s ability to add value to the
local subsidiaries’ innovation transfer processes requires both knowledge and
understanding of the subsidiaries’ local contexts (cf. Campbell et al. 1995; Forsgren
and Holm 2010). Being an outsider (e.g., Johanson and Vahlne 2009), the CHQ’s
suffer from a lack of knowledge about the subsidiary context and the knowledge
controlled by the subsidiary. In line with this, research suggests that if knowledge
transfer originates within a context of confusion it will hamper the ability of the
involved participants to improve performance (Ambos and Ambos 2007). This
implies that, without being at least somewhat connected to the local subsidiaries’
transfer activities and aware of their contextual differences, CHQ monitoring cannot
provide any potential benefits to local subsidiary transfer activities, neither in regard
to the speed and cost of the innovation transfer process, nor for the overall
satisfaction and the implementation of the innovation transfer process.
Hypothesis 2a–b: The effect of contextual constraints on (a) innovation
transfer efficiency and (b) innovation transfer effectiveness is negatively
moderated by CHQ monitoring.
If the innovation transfer process is constrained by the lack of relevant resources
to put into the specific transfer process, the CHQ may have a problem in identifying
where and the extent to which there is a resource deficit when acting as an outsider
to the process. This means that CHQ monitoring in terms of the mere provision of
incentive-based systems (Minbaeva et al. 2003) may only be a signal that the CHQ
does not want to be involved due to the lack of knowledge about or interest in the
transfer project. In addition, by not being directly involved in the transfer project,
any resource allocation effort ‘from a distance’ may only be arduous and wasteful
and done for the wrong reason. Hence, based on the view of the CHQ as an outsider,
suffering from a liability of uncertainty, we could expect that the use of CHQ
monitoring in situations where the participating subsidiaries face resource deficits
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will only prolong the innovation transfer process and give rise to increased costs and
a dissatisfaction of the transfer and implementation process.
Hypothesis 3a–b: The effect of resource constraints on (a) innovation transfer
efficiency and (b) innovation transfer effectiveness is negatively moderated by
CHQ monitoring.
2.3 CHQ Involvement in Sticky Transfer Environments
From a radical uncertainty view, the CHQ has, even as an insider, a limited ability
to know what information to collect, where to collect it and what role they should
play within the process. According to Ambos et al. (2006) and Schulz (2001), the
‘quantity’ of knowledge flows is not nearly as important as the ‘quality’ of the
knowledge transferred. This means that the value added of CHQ management of
subsidiary activities depends on the quality and timing of received know-how and
expertise. Hence, if the CHQ lacks relevant and useful knowledge of the nature
and complexity of the knowledge elements that constitutes the particular
innovation, or even worse, is ignorant about its lack of knowledge (Chiabuschi
et al. 2011), the subsidiaries involved in the transfer process have to adapt to the
CHQ’s lack of relevant knowledge instead of being able to rely on it. The
knowledge and support received will therefore be of rather poor quality. Under
such circumstance, the headquarters involvement in subsidiary activities may only
demotivate the subsidiaries participating in the transfer, ‘‘even if such intervention
is entirely benevolent in its intentions’’ (Foss et al. 2012, p. 248). Such misguided
benevolence and over-commitment can only be harmful (Verbeke and Greidanus
2009) and result in less effective implementation efforts and dissatisfaction of the
innovation transfer process. It may also require an increase in information
gathering activities among the participating subsidiaries, which ultimately would
be very costly and time consuming. Consequently, the following two hypotheses
can be formulated:
Hypothesis 4a–b: The effect of knowledge ambiguity on (a) innovation transfer
efficiency and (b) innovation transfer effectiveness is negatively moderated by
CHQ involvement.
The ‘liability of uncertainty’ of the subsidiary context further suggests that there
is a cognitive disconnection between the CHQ and the subsidiary managers’
perceptions. As stated by Foss et al. (2012, p. 252), where there are contextual
contingencies that are problematic, then ‘‘supplying the extra intelligent effort that
may be required’’ becomes difficult. In network MNCs, the involvement by the
CHQ may turn into harmful intervention if it does not understand these
contingencies and is not able to provide useful and reliable knowledge and support
(Foss et al. 2012). This may lead to an increase in transfer costs and could
compromise the actual outcome of the innovation transfer process. This is in line
with Verbeke and Greidanus (2009, p. 14) suggesting that failed commitments may
stem from contextual misconceptions of corporate managers as a result of an
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overconfidence of its own role in the process, rather than the possession of reliable
knowledge. Hence, if the transfer process is constrained by, for instance, cognitive
or organizational differences between the sending and receiving units, CHQ
involvement may therefore harm rather than add value to the process. This could
result in a loss in motivation and work effort among the participating units. Based
on this reasoning, we expect that:
Hypothesis 5a–b: The effect of contextual constraints on (a) innovation
transfer efficiency and (b) innovation transfer effectiveness is negatively
moderated by CHQ involvement.
When the process is constrained by an explicit resource scarcity, a more hands-on
approach in terms of an active intervention and support would imply that the CHQ
will be able to actively provide the participating subsidiaries with time and
resources. It has been argued that the CHQ, by being an ‘‘insider’’ in the process, is
in a position to allocate the right resources at the right time, despite its lack of
knowledge and understanding of the transfer context (cf. Dellestrand and Kappen
2012; Miao et al. 2016). Even though the CHQ as an outsider acts under a cloud of
uncertainty (e.g., Vahlne et al. 2012), that is act under situations of which they have
little or no information, it can be expected that the impact of such uncertainty is less
pronounced in situations where a lack of resources is the main barrier to successful
transfer. Hence, in a resource-constrained transfer environment, ceteris paribus,
CHQ involvement will add value to the transfer process by an active involvement in
terms of actual time, effort and resources spent on the specific transfer project. This
will subsequently improve not only the speed and cost of the transfer process but
also the actual implementation and satisfaction of the innovation transfer process.
Hypothesis 6a–b: The effect of resource constraints on (a) innovation transfer
efficiency and (b) innovation transfer effectiveness is positively moderated by
CHQ involvement.
Our research model, shown in Fig. 1 proposes an integrated model and presents
the individual constructs, the inter-relatedness between the different constructs, and
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Fig. 1 Research model




The data was collected in conjunction with a larger research project on the
development and transfer of innovations in MNCs (cf. Ciabuschi 2004; Persson
2006; Kang 2013). The research focus of the project was on innovation processes
(i.e., innovation development and transfer processes). The unit of analysis for this
paper is lateral transfer projects, where each project is the transfer of a specific
innovation of a source subsidiary to a recipient subsidiary within the same MNC.
The data was collected using a two-stage sampling procedure. In the first stage we
selected a total of 25 MNCs heavily engaged in technology development. The
sampling procedure started by approaching large MNCs with a global presence that
conducted innovation development and innovation transfer projects. Initially, a formal
letter was sent to the companies asking them to participate in the study. After an initial
presentation of the project and having obtained access to the companies, a first meeting
was held at the CHQ with purpose of getting acquainted with the organization and to
request for potential respondents at the subsidiary level. Thereafter the screening
process of which innovations that would be suitable for the study was initiated.
Meetings were then arranged with the corporate managers, the divisional headquarter
managers and senior management teams to identify possible innovations. The next
step was to visit the subsidiaries and key units involved in developing the identified
innovations. During this stage, we got access to subsidiary level managers and
engineers involved in the identified innovation development and transfer processes.
For practical reasons we requested to investigate maximum of three innovation
transfer projects for each participating MNCs. Three basic selection criteria were used
when selecting innovation projects: the innovations should be important to the
company, have been completed no later than 10 years ago, and have been transferred
to other units within the MNC. After the innovation projects were identified, the source
subsidiary managers and/or engineers that were involved in the transfer process were
selected as the respondents for the questionnaire.
The final sample contained a total of 186 dyadic transfer projects in 25
participating MNCs in different manufacturing industries, e.g., paper and pulp,
machinery and equipment, electrical machinery and motor vehicles, relating to 87
different innovations. A total of 65 subsidiaries were investigated, located in 15
countries in Asia, Europe and North America. Each subsidiary had developed on
average 1.2 innovations and the average subsidiary size, in terms of the number of
employees, was 630 with average annual sales of 270 million euros.
3.2 Data Collection
The data was collected between 2002 and 2009, by visiting subsidiaries located in 15
countries. The data collection was carried out using a standardized questionnaire
administered through face-to-face interviews with R&D managers and engineers at
the sending subsidiaries. These subsidiaries were involved in both the development
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and the transfer process of the focal innovation. In order to avoid ambiguous questions
and to enhance the applicability of indicators, the questionnaire was pre-tested
through two independent pilot interviews with MNC managers and a group of
executive MBA students. Since the scope of the standardized questionnaire was
extensive, encompassing several aspects of the innovation development and transfer
process, sending out the questionnaire by e-mail was deemed unfeasible. Instead, data
for each innovation were collected through face-to-face interviews conducted at the
subsidiary that had developed the innovation. The duration of the interviews was
between 2 and 4 h. Sometimes the interviews were followed by visits to the facilities
and practical demonstrations of the innovation in question. In most cases several
respondents took part in the interviews (e.g., subsidiary top managers, R&D managers
and/or engineers). This implies that we use multiple respondents since each of these
subsidiary respondents individually answered the questionnaire. An advantage with
this face-to-face approach is that it allows the interviewer to have greater control over
the questionnaire survey. In addition it ensures that the information is received from a
knowledgeable person, and increases the possibility to clarify questions, as well as to
detect inconsistencies in the answers. Consequently, this research method offers the
advantage of providing high quality data, by reducing the missing data for individual
questions to a minimum and ensuring that the objectives for the questions are met (cf.
Fowler 1993). A consequence of this approach is that we only have information from
key respondents at the ‘‘sending’’ subsidiaries.
3.3 Variables and Measures
3.3.1 Dependent Variables
In this paper we investigate the extent to which CHQ management can add value to
the subsidiary-level transfer processes. The value added role of CHQ management is
measured as the impact on the innovation transfer performance of the particular
innovation projects studied. For the innovation transfer performance, we made a
distinction between transfer efficiency and transfer effectiveness. This distinction
has been used by Pe´rez-Nordtvedt et al. (2008), where they claim that both
efficiency and effectiveness are needed to understand knowledge transfer perfor-
mance and that these two dimensions reflect different aspects of knowledge transfer
performance. The first dependent variable transfer efficiency relates to the speed and
cost of the transfer project between the sender subsidiaries and the recipient
subsidiaries. This concept is based on Daft (1998) and Pe´rez-Nordtvedt et al. (2008),
where efficiency is defined as the amount of resources used in terms of speed and
economy. The variable consists of four items. The respondents were asked (1) to
what extent the counterparts have received the innovation very quickly, (2) if the
starting point of the innovation transfer was much earlier than expected, (3) if the
first day of innovation used by the receiver was much earlier than expected and (4)
if the actual costs of innovation transfer were much lower than expected (reverse
coded). All items were measured using a seven-point scale (where 1 = totally
disagree and 7 = totally agree). We used the average value of the items for this
variable (Cronbach’s alpha was 0.75). The questions measuring the speed are based
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on Zander and Kogut (1995) and Zahra et al. (2000). The question covering cost is
based on the work of Teece (1977), Szulanski (1996) and Hansen et al. (2005). In
the studies of Ciabuschi et al. (2011) and Yamin et al. (2011) similar measurements
to cover both speed and costs has been used.
The second dependent variable transfer effectiveness refers to the level of transfer
completion; innovation adaptation (in terms of the innovation was easily used by the
receiving unit); and the extent to the satisfaction of innovation transfer process. Daft
(1998) and Pe´rez-Nordtvedt et al. (2008) define effectiveness as the degree to which
goals are attained in terms of ‘comprehension and usefulness’. In line with this
definition, we use three indicators to capture the level of completion, adoption and
satisfaction with the transfer process. We asked the respondents to assess the extent (1)
of completed innovation transfer, (2) to which the innovation has been very easy to
adopt by this counterpart and (3) to which the performance the innovation transfer
process was very satisfactory. The items were measured using a seven-point scale
(where 1 = totally disagree and 7 = totally agree) and we used the average value of
these three items (Cronbach’s alpha was 0.73). The questions regarding the level of
completion and a satisfactory transfer outcome is based on Daft (1998). The term easy
adoption is based on Lane and Lubatkin (1998), Lord and Ranft (2000) and Simonin
(1999) where easy adoption captures the usefulness of the transferred knowledge and
thus a measure of effective transfer processes (Yamin et al. 2011).
3.3.2 Independent Variables
The three independent variables are knowledge ambiguity, contextual constraints,
and resource constraints. These variables capture different aspects of ‘sticky’
transfer environments. The variable knowledge ambiguity covers the inherent
tacitness, complexity and specificity of the knowledge contained in the innovation
itself. Winter (1987), Bresman et al. (1999) and Zander and Kogut (1995) delineate
knowledge ambiguity in terms of the relative articulability and codifiability of
knowledge. Knowledge ambiguity can be captured by the newness and variety of
the interdependent skills and assets that are linked to a particular knowledge (Reed
and DeFillippi 1990) such as different interdependent technologies, routines,
individuals, and resources (Simonin 1999); or transaction of specific skills and
assets that are utilized in production processes; or in the provision of services
(Simonin 1999). Accordingly, we asked the respondents to assess the extent to
which the transferred innovation comprises (1) technology that is new to your unit,
(2) a high variety of knowledge bases (e.g., chemistry, physics and engineering).
The respondents was also asked if, to develop the innovation technology/process
know-how, they had to invest significantly in (3) specialized equipment and
facilities and (4) skilled human resources (Cronbach’s alpha was 0.72).
The variable contextual constraints covers differences in the cognitive and
organizational characteristics among the sending- and the recipient units. The
respondents were asked to evaluate to what extent (1) your unit hesitates to transfer
the innovation as you will lose your advantage within the MNC, (2) the counterpart
hesitates to receive the innovation as it was not invented by them, (3) technical
differences makes transfer problematic, and (4) organizational differences makes
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transfer problematic (Cronbach’s alpha was 0.73). The first two questions relate to
cognitive barriers and has been used by Katz and Allen (1982) and Lichtenthaler
and Ernst (2006). The questions three and four relates to the organizational context
and have been used by Allen (1977) and Szulanski (1996) in their research on
organizational barriers in knowledge transfer processes.
The third independent variable resource constraints, is intended to capture
difficulties in terms of the availability of necessary time and resources to put into the
particular transfer project (cf. Lin et al. 2008). As argued in Minbaeva and Michailova
(2004), the ability to transfer knowledge is contingent on the access to necessary
resources. The necessary resources may vary in different organizations and relates to
various aspects such as time, human resources, financial resources, and up-to-date
information system (cf. Szulanski 1996). We asked the respondents to assess if (1) the
lack of necessary resources (efforts, time and resources) within your unit to put in the
specific transfer relationship makes the transfer difficult, and if (2) the lack of
necessary resources (efforts, time and resources) in the counterpart to put in this
specific relationship makes the transfer difficult (Cronbach’s alpha was 0.71).
3.3.3 Moderating Variables
In order to investigate the value added role of CHQ management of innovation
transfer processes, two moderating variables were developed. The first variable,
CHQ monitoring captures a hands-off CHQ strategy and the focus of the traditional
incentive-creating function of CHQ (cf. Chandler 1991). Accordingly, the
respondents were asked to evaluate the extent to which (1) financial bonuses are
given to individuals for sharing knowledge, (2) individuals with the reputation for
sharing knowledge are favored for promotion, and (3) employees are fully aware of
that bonuses may be received for knowledge sharing (Cronbach’s alpha was 0.73).
Similar measurements have been used in studies by Balkin and Gomez-Mejia
(1987), Galbraith and Merrill (1991) and Fey and Furu (2008).
The second variable, the CHQ involvement reflects a more ‘hands-on’ CHQ
strategy. Based on the suggestion by Forsgren and Holm (2010), this role reflects the
CHQ involvement in and contribution to the performance of value-creating processes
at the subsidiary level. The variable intends to capture the level of attention to,
direction of, and participation in the transfer process by the CHQ. A similar approach
has been used by Ciabuschi et al. (2011), Dellestrand and Kappen (2012) and Yamin
et al. (2011). We thus asked the respondents to assess the extent to which the CHQ (1)
has instructed you to share this innovation with the counterpart, (2) has been heavily
involved in conducting the actual transfer process with the counterpart, (3) has taken
the complete responsibility for the transfer of this innovation to this counterpart, and
(4) with regard to transfer of the innovation, to what extent is this driven by the
requirements from CHQ (Cronbach’s alpha was 0.69; MIC value was 0.37).
3.3.4 Control Variables
Some control variables that can influence the performance of knowledge transfer
efficiency and effectiveness are included in this study. The first control variable is age
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of relationship between the sender and the recipient unit and how this can affect the
performance of transfer process. Successful innovation transfers will be more likely
when it takes place between older and more established relationships (Fey and Furu
2008). Hence, we asked the respondents to assess the age of the relationship between
their unit and the unit/business area that received the innovation. The second control
variable captures the level of previous relationship between the sending and receiving
units. A shared history and routines of jointly utilizing transferred knowledge will lead
to shared meanings and behaviors, which in turn will facilitate coordination of the
transfer activities by making counterpart’s behaviors more understandable, pre-
dictable and stable (March and Simon 1958; Nelson and Winter 1982; Szulanski
1996). The level of previous relationship will thus ease the transfer process by making
it more institutionalized and routinized, thus affecting the transfer performance in
terms of efficiency and effectiveness. The variable is measured by asking the
respondents to assess their general relationship with the receiving unit in terms of (1)
the level of previous cooperation; (2) the extent of previous shared knowledge; and (3)
the extent of existing transfer routines (Cronbach’s alpha was 0.72).
We also test for the relevance of the innovation. The relevance of knowledge is
discussed in Grant (1996b) as an important condition for acquiring returns from the
knowledge. The relevance of the knowledge for an organization makes the knowledge
valuable (Schulz 2003). It has been shown (Bjo¨rkman et al. 2004) that the perceived
strategic importance of knowledge by the CHQ as well as the MNC units have a
positive impact on the knowledge transfer processes. The relevance of innovation is
therefore likely to facilitate the innovation transfer process and make transfer process
more efficient and effective. Hence, the respondents were asked to assess the
importance of the focal innovation (1) to your unit; (2) to the division/business area as a
whole; and (3) to the MNC as a whole (Cronbach’s alpha was 0.76).
Lastly, we tested for the spatial distance between the sending and the receiving
units. The control variable subsidiary location tries to capture different dimensions
of distance between these units in terms of the geographic distance as well as
cultural and linguistic distance (cf. Ambos and Ambos 2009). Such dimensions of
distance could lead to an increase in cost, communication difficulties, and resource
allocation complexity, thus reducing the efficiency and effectiveness of innovation
transfers (Baaij and Slangen 2013; Dellenstrand and Kappen 2012). The most
noticeable difference would occur between Western and Eastern (Asian) sub-
sidiaries, since the geographical, cultural and linguistic differences would be most
prevalent (Ambos and Ambos 2009). This distinction of Western and Eastern
subsidiaries has been used in other recent studies (cf. Bhagat et al. 2002). Hence, we
identified the respondents (e.g., the sending units) country of location and also asked
them about the geographical location of their receiving units. We then created a
dummy variable to control for whether the innovation transfer occurred between
Western to Asian subsidiaries (coded as 1), or among Western (European and/or
North American) to Western subsidiaries (coded as 0). More details about the
operationalization and construct reliability are shown in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
All the included variables show a high inter-item reliability with Cronbach’s
alpha above the recommended threshold value of 0.70 (Hair et al. 2006), except for
the variable CHQ active managerial function (Cronbach’s alpha 0.69). However
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when there are a small number of items in the scale (fewer than ten), the mean inter-
item correlation (MIC) value can be used to further support the reliability of the
items. Optimal MIC values range from 0.2 to 0.4 (recommended by Briggs and
Cheek 1986). The MIC value for the variable CHQ involvement was 0.37 which is
within the rage of optimal MIC values. To examine the extent of common method
bias in our data, a Harman’s one factor test was conducted (Podsakoff and Organ
1986). The results of the principal components factor analysis revealed eleven
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 that together accounted for 82.4% of the
total variance explained. Together with multiple factors and the relatively low
amount of total variance explained by the first two factors (20.9 and 11.1%
respectively) indicates that common method bias should not be a significant
problem for analysis of the data (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). We also reduced this
risk of common method bias through the design of the data collection process,
where the answers were gathered from multiple respondents that were involved in
either the innovation development or transfer process for a particular innovation.
4 Results
The hypotheses were tested using OLS regression. Here we use the basic multi-attribute
measurement model represented by Fishbein’s (1963) equation. Table 1 presents some
descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables used in the regression
analysis. Some significant correlations may exist between variables, but, since a rule of
thumb is above 0.7 (cf. Hair et al. 2006) none of the correlations were high enough to
indicate any problems with multicollinearity in the data. To check for further
multicollinearity, especially for the moderating variables, the variance inflation factor
(VIF-values) were calculated. A common cut-off threshold corresponds to a VIF-value
below 10 (cf. Hair et al. 2006, p. 230), and since there were no VIF values greater than
2.61(where one variable showed 2.61 and another 2.39 all others below 2)
multicollinearity does not appear to pose any severe problems in the analysis. In
addition, a check for normal distribution was done through performing a Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test. This revealed a significance of all variables greater than 0.06 (where less
than 0.05 will have tendencies of non-normality). We also carried out normal probability
plots which showed that all the variables were normally distributed.
Table 2 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis. The test for the
control variables are shown in model 1 and model 4. In model 1 none of the control
variables were significantly related to innovation transfer efficiency (F value 0.47
and adjusted R2 -0.03). This is similar to recent studies that provide evidence of
that previous engagements and collaboration between sending and receiving units
do not speed up current work effort as could be expected (Dellestrand and Kappen
2012). In Model 4 it is revealed that of the control variables, only the ‘previous
relationship’ has a significant positive effect on transfer effectiveness. There is also
a tentative direct relationship between the ‘subsidiary location’ and innovation
transfer effectiveness (F value 1.66 and adjusted R2 0.04).
The independent variables and the moderating variables were included in Model
2 (transfer efficiency) and Model 5 (transfer effectiveness). Model 2 reveals a
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significant F value of 5.72 (p\ 0.001) and an adjusted R2 of 0.36. Model 2 reveals
that there is a direct and significant negative effect of all the independent variables
on innovation transfer efficiency. Hence, these three independent variables are thus
constraining the efficiency of innovation transfer. It also shows that there is a direct
and significant negative effect of the two moderating variables on innovation
transfer efficiency. In Model 5 the independent variables and the moderating
variables were included for transfer effectiveness. The model shows a significant F
value of 4.89 (p\ 0.001) and an adjusted R2 of 0.31. The results reveal that
knowledge ambiguity and resource constraints are directly and negatively related to
innovation transfer effectiveness. There is a tentative and direct negative impact of
contextual constraints on innovation transfer effectiveness. Model 5 also show that
CHQ monitoring is direct and negatively related to innovation transfer effectiveness
whereas there is a negative but not significant direct effect of CHQ involvement on
transfer effectiveness.
The findings of the hypotheses testing are found in Model 3 (transfer efficiency)
and Model 6 (transfer effectiveness) in which the moderating (interaction) variables
‘CHQ monitoring’ and ‘CHQ involvement’ are included. Model 3 shows a
significant F value of 13.15 (p\ 0.001) and an adjusted R2 of 0.72. Model 6 reveals
a significant F value of 4.28 (p\ 0.001) and an adjusted R2 of 0.41. A suggested by
Aitken and West (1991), all the independent were standardized before we conducted
the test of the moderating effects of CHQ monitoring and CHQ involvement (e.g.,
an interaction effect test). The moderating effect is provided by testing the effect of
the interaction between CHQ monitoring and CHQ involvement and the indepen-
dent variables on transfer efficiency and effectiveness.
In Model 3 it is shown that the effect of knowledge ambiguity on transfer
efficiency is negatively moderated by CHQ monitoring. Similarly, we find that the
effect of knowledge ambiguity on transfer effectiveness is negatively but not
significantly moderated by CHQ monitoring. Accordingly, this gives support for
hypotheses 1a (see Model 3) but 1b is not supported (see Model 6). The results also
reveal that the effect of contextual constraints on transfer efficiency and on transfer
effectiveness is negatively moderated by CHQ monitoring. This lends support for
hypotheses 2a (see Model 3) and 2b respectively (see Model 6). Contrary to our
expectations, Model 3 and Model 6 reveal that the effect of resource constraints on
transfer efficiency as well as on transfer effectiveness is positively moderated by
CHQ monitoring. Hence, the findings do not lend any support for hypotheses 3a and
3b (see Model 3 and Model 6 respectively).
When testing the moderating effect of CHQ involvement we get support for
hypotheses 4a and 4b. The findings show that the effect of knowledge ambiguity on
transfer efficiency (Model 3) and transfer effectiveness (Model 6) is negatively
moderated by CHQ involvement. The results also show that the effect of contextual
constraints on transfer efficiency (Model 3) as well as on transfer effectiveness
(Model 6) is negatively moderated by CHQ involvement. Hence, both hypotheses
5a and 5b are supported. Finally, the effect of resource constraints on transfer
efficiency is positively moderated by CHQ involvement (Model 3). However CHQ
involvement does not moderate the effect of resource constraints on transfer
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effectiveness (Model 6). We therefore find support for hypothesis 6a but not for
hypothesis 6b.
5 Discussion
This paper addresses the literature on the value added role of CHQ management of
subsidiary level activities (e.g., Egelhoff 2010; Goold and Campbell 2002; Poppo
2003). We examine the value added of CHQ monitoring and CHQ involvement
during innovation transfer process at the subsidiary level and the issue of these
being for a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ cause (cf. Foss et al. 2012). The value-added of these
two managerial approaches is viewed in terms of their impact on the success of the
transfer process, e.g., the efficiency and the effectiveness of the process. Our
overarching aim was to address the lack of research on the value added role of these
strategies used by CHQ to manage innovation transfer processes, in particular under
certain ‘sticky’ transfer conditions. This is done by emphasizing the knowledge
situation of the CHQ and how this is related to the value added nature of CHQ
management of innovation transfer processes at the subsidiary level. To conclude,
this study has more systematically tested and discussed the important link between
corporate intentions, transfer contingencies and transfer performance than has been
done in previous studies.
5.1 Findings
Considering the use of CHQ monitoring in sticky transfer environments, the results
show that there is a negative moderating effect of CHQ monitoring on both the
efficiency and the effectiveness of innovation transfer in situations when the
subsidiaries are facing contextual constraints. This lend support for the argument
that if the CHQ uses monitoring, that is acts as an ‘outsider’ in a context of
confusion, it will only impede the ability of the involved participants to improve
performance. The results also show that CHQ monitoring has a negative impact on
the innovation transfer efficiency in situations of high knowledge ambiguity, i.e. a
high uncertainty of the inherent technology. This highlights the fact that the CHQ
may have an overconfidence of the subsidiaries role in the process which may only
lead to confusion and demotivation and may slow down transfer processes (cf.
Forsgren and Holm 2010; Verbeke and Greidanus 2009).
The study did not lend any support for the suggestion that there is a negative
impact of CHQ monitoring on the effectiveness of innovation transfers when facing
knowledge ambiguity. The non-significant result may be due to the simple reason
that there are no ex ante expectations of a satisfactory transfer process when the
focal innovation are new and very complex to the receiving subsidiaries. Contrary to
our expectation, the results show that if the innovation transfer process of the
subsidiaries was imposed with resource constraints, then CHQ monitoring seems to
be adequate ‘‘enough’’ to provide both transfer efficiency and effectiveness. We find
the results rather interesting, especially with regard to the view of the disadvantages
of hands-off parenting through control rather than active involvement (Forsgren and
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Holm 2010). As stated by Goold and Campbell (2002, p. 222), the value-adding role
of the parent relies on ‘‘being more involved in guiding co-ordination between
units’’. One possible reason for this result may simply be that if the transfer
processes are not heavily dependent on headquarters possession of appropriate
knowledge then CHQ monitoring may be for a good cause as long as it is perceived
as reasonable fair and does, for instance, not break any psychological contracts (cf.
Rousseu and Parks 1993).
Turning to the impact of CHQ involvement on innovation transfer perfor-
mance, the results, as predicted, show that there is a negative moderating effect
of CHQ involvement on transfer efficiency as well as effectiveness in situations
where the subsidiaries are facing contextual barriers. This give support to the
notion that losses in efficiency and effectiveness can be related to what Verbeke
and Greidanus (2009) call ‘opportunistic bounds on reliability,’ whereby the
CHQ make ex ante commitments in good faith based on a hunch rather than
deep knowledge or insight, which may increase the ‘‘likelihood of reordering of
preferences after an original commitment is made’’ (Verbeke and Greidanus
2009, p. 1483). Opposed to what has been suggested, this result indicates that
headquarters, even if it is an ‘insider’, is not in a position to add value to
innovation transfer processes if it lacks an understanding of the specific transfer
context (cf. Dellestrand and Kappen 2012; Miao et al. 2016). Hence, our study
provides evidence in line with Chung (2014) that a managerial intention to ‘do
good’ is not enough, it is important to understand the underlying contingencies
affecting headquarters intention.
The results of this study lend support for the suggestion that the CHQ is able
to add value to innovation transfer processes in terms of an increased efficiency
in situations where the processes are constrained by a lack of tangible resources.
This supports the notion that the impact of uncertainty is less pronounced
in situations where a lack of tangible support and resources is the main barrier to
successful transfer. Hence, an active involvement of the CHQ has the ability to
actually speed up the transfer process and reduce the costs of the process.
However, we could not find any positive moderating effect of CHQ involvement
on the transfer effectiveness when the transfer process was constrained by
resource deficits. There are two possible reasons behind this result. First, the
used measurement of CHQ involvement does not specify the actual amount of
support and involvement (e.g., time, resources and money spend on the
innovation transfer). Hence, we have unfortunately not been able to capture
explicitly the quantity and the quality of the involvement of the CHQ. Secondly,
the result may also reflect the fact an active involvement of the CHQ without
any actual targeted actions and activities does not give rise to a satisfactory
completion and implementation of the innovation at the receiving subsidiaries
(cf. Chung 2014).
It can be concluded that the characteristics of the investigated MNC subsidiaries
do not influence the innovation transfer performance as could be expected. For
instance, the previous relationship history of the sending and receiving units (in
terms of the duration and level of previous relationship) reveals no effect on transfer
efficiency. This is a bit surprising. One explanation for this could be that there is an
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inherent context specificity of the experience gained from collaborating and sharing
knowledge on a more daily basis, which is difficult to incorporate and make use of
in a specific focal innovation project.
5.2 Theoretical Implications
Theoretically, our findings can be interpreted as supporting Forsgren et al’s
(2005, 2010) suggestion that CHQ has limited knowledge and thus a limited
ability to influence the behavior and the processes of their foreign subsidiaries.
Due to this, the CHQ ability to influence innovation transfer processes may be
considerably constrained. More specifically, the results suggest that CHQ can
influence the outcome of innovation transfer processes by tailoring their
managerial approach in relation to the underlying conditions characterizing the
transfer processes and their knowledge and understanding of these particular
conditions. Hence, our study contributes to the research on the network MNC
suggesting that the ability of the headquarters to successfully add value to intra-
corporate transfer processes has to be understood in the light of its ‘knowledge
situation’ (Forsgren and Holm 2010). It is interesting that headquarters are able
to pinpoint important innovation projects but do not seem to be able to provide
any substantial increase in innovation transfer performance as they get involved
in the project.
As highlighted in this paper, the CHQ in the network MNC is an outsider
suffering under the liability of uncertainty and may in certain circumstances, for
different reasons, be bounded reliable. The results of this study give reason to
believe that although headquarters may be involved in subsidiary activities for a
good cause there is a high likelihood of value destruction. In a recent article by
to Foss et al. (2012) the authors claim that the general assumption of
headquarters benevolence needs to be modified, particularly in less formalized
network MNCs. ‘‘The dominant assumption of the MNC literature that CHQs are
benevolent is a strong assumption, as selective intervention hazard may be
substantial’’ (Foss et al. 2012, p. 257). In line with this research, our findings
implies that intervention hazards may occur since the CHQ lack adequate,
relevant and useful knowledge, and may end up being over-committed and over-
confident in its own abilities. If the headquarters possess relevant and useful
knowledge it will be in a stronger position to evaluate the significance of their
involvement in terms of when, where and how, and thus act in a less
opportunistic manner relative to the subsidiaries. In this context, there is a
substantial body of research in social studies and motivational psychology (e.g.,
intervention theory) that studies the problem of intervention for securing desired
outcomes. For instance, Argyris’ (1970) intervention theory addresses the issue
of when it is desirable to intervene and when it is not appropriate. He argues that
successful intervention depends on appropriate and useful knowledge. In line
with this suggestion, our results give reason to believe that intervention in terms
of CHQ involvement in combination with a lack of relevant and useful
knowledge may be perceived as demotivating rather than supporting. In other
words, if the CHQ involves itself in innovation processes at the subsidiary level
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despite a lack of relevant knowledge rather than because of it, such participation
will be of much less value added than the parenting theory suggests (Campbell
et al. 1995; Goold et al. 1994, 1998).
5.3 Limitations and Implications for Managers and Future Research
Although we believe that our study contributes to the research on the value-adding
role of MNC corporate headquarters for subsidiary knowledge transfer behavior,
the current paper is not without limitations. Most notably the one-sided view of
this phenomenon where the information is only based on the ‘‘sending’’
subsidiaries may give rise to problems of common method bias. In an effort to
reduce the problems associated with this approach, the questionnaire was
answered by multiple respondents at the sending subsidiaries. In addition, in
order to control for the self-assessment bias of the data, we used a face-to-face
data collection technique. Although this does not remove the problem we believe
it reduces it to a great extent. A second limitation stems from the fact that we
have not been able to explicitly test the knowledge situation of the CHQ. This
calls for future studies on the link between headquarters’ actual knowledge,
understanding and experience of subsidiary-level activities, and their commit-
ments. This could be made with proxies such as knowledge about the innovation
processes (development and transfer) in terms of its technical context, organiza-
tional context, and relational- and cognitive context. A third limitation is based on
our quite blunt measurement of the headquarters functions. A more fine grained
measurement of the active managerial function would be helpful in order to
distinguish between whether headquarters listens, offer guidance, has good
communication skills, and is open to new ideas etc.
Our findings provide some important implications for the role of top
management in knowledge transfer activities. One managerial implication that
can be drawn from this study is that when the CHQ does not have sufficient and
relevant knowledge about the innovation transfer process, an active managerial
function is as inefficient as a monitoring function with regard to the efficiency of
innovation transfer processes. If corporate managers involve themselves without
useful knowledge or forethought, it could easily overestimate the potential
outcomes of subsidiary level activities, thus possibly destroying rather than adding
value to them. This corresponds to research on the psychology of power and the
‘illusion of control’ (e.g., Langer 1975). It is argued that power often has far-
reaching effects and is related to the sense of control, rather than control as such.
From this point of view the ‘powerful’ headquarters’ possession of control may
impede learning and predispose toward greater risk taking behavior. Although
research within the network tradition suggests that MNCs today are more
democratized organizations, our study implies that corporate management still is
stuck in a ‘control and command leadership’ (cf. Tallman and Koza 2010). The
CHQ should carefully consider the ‘how’ of managing innovation transfer
processes at the subsidiary level, e.g., that a direct or an indirect management is
dependent on the specific conditions under which the transfer takes place. This is
in line with Stewardt et al. (2015) arguing for a higher awareness among IB
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scholars as well as mangers of the overall contextual contingencies in which
transfer activities occur.
The control variable ‘subsidiary location’ that captured the spatial distance
between a focal subsidiary and other subsidiaries within the MNC showed no direct
negative effect on transfer efficiency as expected. Hence, in this study we did not
find support for the suggestion that subsidiary-level activities, in general, become
more costly as the spatial distance increases (cf. Asmussen and Goerzen 2013; Baaij
and Slangen 2013). However, one could expect that the ‘negative’ direct effect of
CHQ monitoring as well as CHQ involvement would be particularly evident as the
geographic distance increases. It has in fact been suggested that personal behavioral
monitoring may be less effective than for instance output monitoring for the purpose
of knowledge exchange as such geographic disaggregation of the CHQ increases
(Baaij and Slangen 2013).
Since this study is limited to the study of the CHQ as one single entity in a
specific geographic location, future research could benefit from studies of the
impact of the evolving re-organization of parenting activities, in terms of the
consequences of CHQ disaggregation, on the strategic management on innovations
in MNCs. In relation to this, research has also discussed vertical disaggregation in
terms of the opportunities of relieving CHQ of this burden of controlling and
coordinating dispersed subsidiaries through the delegation of CHQ’s functions to
sub-levels such as the regional, divisional and subsidiary level (Mahnke et al. 2012;
Alfoldi et al. 2012; Piekkari et al. 2010). The existence of multiple headquarters
may imply a more diverse set of capabilities and knowledge being deployed in
innovation projects, which will have an effect on the end result of a transfer
processes. An interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate the
effect of such delegation of headquarters functions on the development and transfer
of innovations in MNCs. Finally, it would be interesting to know more about the
antecedents, e.g., the different interests and motivations, among the corporate
managers to actively involve themselves in subsidiary-level activities, in particular
innovation projects and processes. While prior studies have been occupied with the
effect of corporate parenting, future studies pursing this line of inquiry could have
the potential to make a contribution to management research in general and transfer
management in MNCs in particular.
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Appendix









Transfer efficiency 0.75 NA Ciabuschi et al. (2011),
Hansen et al. (2005),
Szulanski (1996),
Yamin et al. (2011),
Zander and Kogut
(1995)
1. Counterpart have started
using the innovation very
quickly
1–7 0.78
2. Starting point of the
innovation transfer was much
earlier than expected
1–7 0.79
3. First day of innovation used
by the receiver was much
earlier than expected
1–7 0.84
4. Actual costs of innovation
transfer were much lower
than expected
1–7 0.60




Yamin et al. (2011)
1. To what extent the
innovation transfer has been
completed between your unit
each of the following
counterparts
1–7 0.75
2. Innovation has been very
easy to adopt by this
counterpart
1–7 0.82






regard to the innovation
transferred





1. The innovation comprises
technology that is new to
your unit
1–7 0.71
2. The innovation comprises a




3. To develop the innovation
technology/process know-




4. To develop the innovation
technology/process know-
how, you had to invest
significantly in skilled human
resources
1–7 0.79











regard to the transfer of
innovation:





1. You hesitate to transfer the
innovation as you will lose
your advantage within the
MNC
1–7 0.64
2. Counterpart hesitates to
receive the innovation as it
was not invented by them
1–7 0.73






Resource constraints with regard
to the transfer of innovation




1. Lack of necessary resources
(efforts, time and resources)




2. Lack of necessary resources
(efforts, time and resources)
within the counterpart to put
in this specific relationship
makes the transfer difficult
1–7 0.88
CHQ monitoring 0.73 NA Balkin and Gomez-Mejia
(1987), Galbraith and
Merrill (1991), Fey and
Furu (2008)
1. Financial bonuses are given
to individuals for sharing
knowledge with co-workers
1–7 0.80
2. Individuals with the
reputation for sharing
knowledge with others are
favoured for promotion
1–7 0.77
3. Employees are fully aware of














CHQ involvement 0.69 0.37 Ciabuschi et al. (2011),
Dellestrand and Kappen
(2012), Yamin et al.
(2011)
1. MNC HQ has formally




2. MNC HQ have themselves
been heavily involved in
conducting the actual transfer
process with the counterpart
1–7 0.80
3. MNC HQ have taken the
complete responsibility for
the transfer of this innovation
to this counterpart
1–7 0.71
4. With regard to transfer of the
innovation, to what extent is




Age of relationship NA NA Fey and Furu (2008)
Age of relationship between
your unit and the divisional/
business area and/or MNC
units that have received the
innovation
Year NA










2. To what extent have you
previously (beside this
innovation) shared
knowledge together with the
counterparts (receiving units)
1–7 0.84






Relevance of innovation 0.76 NA
1. Importance of the innovation
to your unit
1–7 0.65 Schulz (2003), Bjo¨rkman
et al. (2004)
2. Importance of the innovation
to the division/business area
as a whole
1–7 0.94
3. Importance of the innovation
to the MNC as a whole
1–7 0.87
The Value-Adding Role of the Corporate Headquarters in…
123
References
Aitken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple Regressions: Testing and Interpreting Interactions.
Newbury Park: Sage.
Alfoldi, E. A., Clegg, L. J., & McGaughey, S. L. (2012). Coordination at the edge of the empire: The
delegation of headquarters functions through regional management mandates. Journal of
International Management, 18(3), 276–292.
Allen, T. J. (1977). Managing the Flow of Technology. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Ambos, T., & Ambos, B. (2007). Organizing the discontinuous knowledge flows: A new perspective on
the management of knowledge and innovation in MNCs. In S. Tallman (Ed.), A New Generation in
International Strategic Management (pp. 142–161). London: Edward Elgar.
Ambos, T., & Ambos, B. (2009). The impact of distance on knowledge transfer effectiveness in
multinational corporations. Journal of International Management, 15(1), 1–14.
Ambos, T., Ambos, B., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2006). Learning from foreign subsidiaries: An empirical
investigation of headquarters’ benefits from reverse knowledge transfers. International Business
Review, 15(4), 294–312.
Ambos, B., & Mahnke, V. (2010). How do MNC headquarters add value? Management International
Review, 50(4), 403–412.
Andersson, U., Forsgren, M., & Holm, U. (2007). Balancing subsidiary influence in the federative MNC:
A business network view. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(5), 802–818.
Andersson, U., & Holm, U. (2010). Managing the Contemporary Multinational: The Role of
Headquarters. Cheltenham: Elgar.
Argyris, C. (1970). Intervention Theory and Method: A Behavioral Science View. Reading: Addison-
Wesley.
Asmussen, C. G., & Goerzen, A. (2013). Unpacking dimensions of foreignness: Firm-specific capabilities
and international dispersion in regional, cultural, and institutional space. Global Strategy Journal,
3(2), 127–149.
Baaij, M. G., & Slangen, A. H. J. (2013). The role of headquarters-subsidiary geographic distance in
strategic decisions by spatially disaggregated headquarters. Journal of International Business
Studies, 44(9), 941–952.
Balkin, D. B., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1987). Toward a contingency theory of compensation strategy.
Strategic Management Journal, 8(2), 169–182.
Barner-Rasmussen, W., Piekkari, R., Scott-Kennel, J., & Welch, C. (2010). Commander in-chief or
absentee landlord? Key perspectives on headquarters in multinational corporations. In U. Holm & U.










Subsidiary location (of sending
and receiving units)
NA NA Ambos and Ambos
(2009), Bhagat et al.
(2002), Ghemawat
(2001)
1. The country location of
sending unit
2. The country location of the
receiving unit (the counterpart)
(dummy where innovation has
been transferred between
1 = Western to Asian





C. Holmstro¨m Lind, O. H. Kang
123
Bartlett, C. A., & Ghoshal, S. (1989). Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution. Boston:
Harvard Business School Press.
Bhagat, R. S., Kedia, B. L., Harveston, P. D., & Triandis, H. C. (2002). Cultural variations in the cross-
border transfer of organizational knowledge: An integrative framework. Academy of Management
Review, 27(2), 204–221.
Bjo¨rkman, I., Barner-Rasmussen, W., & Li, L. (2004). Managing knowledge transfer in MNCs: The
impact of headquarters control mechanisms. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(5),
443–455.
Bouquet, C., & Birkinshaw, J. (2008). Wight versus voice: How foreign subsidiaries gain attention from
corporate headquarters. Academy of Management Journal, 51(3), 577–601.
Bresman, H., Birkinshaw, J., & Nobel, R. (1999). Knowledge transfer in international acquisitions.
Journal of International Business Studies, 30(3), 439–462.
Briggs, S. R., & Cheek, J. M. (1986). The role of factor analysis in the development and evaluation of
personality scales. Journal of Personality, 54(1), 106–148.
Brown, S. L., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (1995). Product development: Past research, present finding, and future
directions. Academy of Management Review, 20(2), 343–378.
Campbell, A., Goold, M., & Alexander, M. (1995). Corporate strategy: The quest for parenting
advantage. Harvard Business Review, 37(2), 120–132.
Chandler, A. D. (1962). Strategy and Structure—Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Chandler, A. (1991). The functions of the headquarters unit in the multi-business firm. Strategic
Management Journal, 12(1), 31–50.
Chung, L. (2014). Headquarters managerial intentionality and reverse transfer of practices. Management
International Review, 54(2), 225–252.
Ciabuschi, F. (2004). On the Innovative MNC: Leveraging Innovations and the Role of IT Systems,
Doctoral Thesis, No. 111. Department of Business Studies, Uniersitetstryckeriet, Uppsala
University, Uppsala.
Ciabuschi, F., Dellestrand, H., & Holm, U. (2012a). The role of headquarters in the contemporary MNC.
Journal of International Management, 18(3), 213–223.
Ciabuschi, F., Forsgren, M., & Martı´n Martı´n, O. (2011). Rationality versus ignorance: The role of MNE
headquarters in subsidiaries innovation processes. Journal of International Business Studies, 42(7),
958–970.
Ciabuschi, F., Forsgren, M., & Martı´n Martı´n, O. (2012b). Headquarters’ involvement and efficiency of
innovation development and transfer in multinationals: A matter of sheer ignorance? International
Business Review, 21(2), 130–144.
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and
innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128–152.
Collins, J., & Hitt, M. (2006). Leveraging tacit knowledge in alliances: The importance of using relational
capabilities to build and leverage relational capital. Journal of Engineering and Technology
Management, 23(3), 147–167.
Collis, D., Young, D., & Goold, M. (2007). The size, structure and performance of corporate
headquarters. Strategic Management Journal, 28(4), 383–405.
Daft, R. L. (1998). Organization Theory and Design. Cincinnati: South-Western College Publishing.
Dellestrand, H., & Kappen, F. (2012). The effects of spatial and contextual factors on headquarters
resource allocation to MNE subsidiaries. Journal of International Business Studies, 43(3), 219–243.
Egelhoff, W. G. (2010). How the parent headquarters adds value to an MNC. Management International
Review, 50(4), 413–431.
Fey, C. F., & Furu, P. (2008). Top management incentive compensation and knowledge sharing in
multinational corporations. Strategic Management Journal, 29(12), 1301–1323.
Fishbein, M. (1963). An investigation of the relationships between beliefs about an object and the attitude
toward that object. Human Relations, 16(3), 233–240.
Forsgren, M. (1997). The advantage paradox of the multinational corporation. In I. Bjo¨rkman & M.
Forsgren (Eds.), The Nature of the International Firm: Nordic Contributions to International
Business Research (pp. 6–85). Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press.
Forsgren, M., & Holm, U. (2010). MNC headquarters’ role in subsidiaries’ value-creating activities: A
problem of rationality or radical uncertainty. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 26(4), 421–430.
Forsgren, M., Holm, U., & Johanson, J. (2005). Managing the Embedded Multinational—A Business
Network View. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
The Value-Adding Role of the Corporate Headquarters in…
123
Foss, N. J. (1997). On the rationales of corporate headquarters. Industrial and Corporate Change, 6(2),
313–338.
Foss, K., Foss, N. J., & Nell, P. H. (2012). MNC organizational form and subsidiary motivation problems:
Controlling intervention hazards in the network MNC. Journal of International Management, 18(3),
247–259.
Fowler, F. J. (1993). Survey Research Methods (2nd ed.). Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
Galbraith, C. S., & Merrill, G. B. (1991). The effect of compensation program and structure on SBU
competitive strategy: A study of technology-intensive firms. Strategic Management Journal, 12(5),
353–370.
Ghemawat, P. (2001). Distance still matters: The hard reality of global expansion. Harvard Business
Review, 79(9), 137–147.
Goold, M., & Campbell, A. (2002). Parenting in complex structures. Long Range Planning, 35(3),
219–243.
Goold, M., Campbell, A., & Alexander, M. (1994). How corporate parents add value to the stand-alone
performance of their businesses. Business Strategy Review, 5(4), 33–55.
Goold, M., Campbell, A., & Alexander, M. (1998). Corporate strategy and parenting theory. Long Range
Planning, 31(2), 308–314.
Grant, R. M. (1996a). Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic Management Journal,
17(Winter Special Issue), 109–122.
Grant, R. M. (1996b). Prospering in dynamically-competitive environments: Organizational capability as
knowledge integration. Organizational Science, 7(4), 375–387.
Hair, J. F., Balck, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. (2006). Multivariate Data
Analysis (6th ed.). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
Hansen, M. T. (1999). The search-transfer problem: The role of weak ties in sharing knowledge across
organization subunits. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(1), 82–111.
Hansen, M. T., Mors, M. L., & Lova˚s, B. (2005). Knowledge sharing in organizations: multiple networks,
multiple phases. Academy of Management Journal, 48(5), 776–793.
Hayek, F. A. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. The American Economic Review, 35(4), 519–530.
Hedlund, G. (1986). The hypermodern MNC: A heterarchy? Human Resource Management, 25(1), 9–35.
Inkpen, A. C. (2000). A note on the dynamics of learning alliances: Competition, cooperation, and
relative scope. Strategic Management Journal, 21(7), 775–779.
Jensen, M. C., & Meekling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency cost and
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J. E. (2009). The Uppsala internationalization process model revisited: From
liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership. Journal of International Business Studies, 40(9),
1411–1431.
Kang, O. H. (2013). The Advantage Paradox: Managing Innovation Processes in the Multinational
Corporation, Doctoral thesis, No. 159. Department of Business Studies, Uppsala University,
Uppsala.
Katz, R., & Allen, T. J. (1982). Investigating the not-invented-here (NIH) syndrome: A look at the
performance, tenure and communication patterns of 50 R&D project groups. R&D Management,
12(1), 7–19.
Kirzner, I. M. (1982). Uncertainty, discovery, and human action: A study of the entrepreneurial profile in
the Misesian system. In I. M. Kirzner (Ed.), Method, Process, and AUSTRIAN Economics (pp.
139–159). Washington, DC: Heath.
Ko, D.-G., Kirsch, L. T., & King, W. R. (2014). Antecedents of knowledge transfer from consultants to
clients in enterprise system implementations. MIS Quarterly, 29(1), 59–85.
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the replication of
technology. Organization Science, 3(3), 383–397.
Kostova, T. (1999). Transnational transfer of strategic organizational practices: A contextual perspective.
Academy of Management Review, 24(2), 308–324.
Kostova, T., & Roth, K. (2002). Adoption of an organizational practice by subsidiaries of multinational
corporations: Institutional and relational effects. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 215–233.
Lane, P. J., & Lubatkin, M. (1998). Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational learning.
Strategic Management Journal, 19(5), 461–478.
Langer, E. J. (1975). The illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32(2),
311–328.
C. Holmstro¨m Lind, O. H. Kang
123
Levin, D. Z., & Cross, R. (2004). Mediating role of trust in effective knowledge transfer. Management
Science, 50(11), 1477–1490.
Lichtenthaler, U., & Ernst, H. (2006). Attitudes to externally organizing knowledge management tasks: A
review, reconsideration and extension of the NIH syndrome. R&D Management, 36(4), 367–386.
Lin, C., Tan, B., & Chang, S. (2008). An exploratory model of knowledge flow barriers within healthcare
organizations. Information & Management, 45(5), 331–339.
Lord, M. D., & Ranft, A. L. (2000). Organizational learning about new international markets: exploring
the internal transfer of local market knowledge. Journal of International Business Studies, 31(4),
573–589.
Mahnke, V., Ambos, B., Nell, P. C., & Hobdari, B. (2012). How do regional headquarters influence
corporate decisions in networked MNCs? Journal of International Management, 18(3), 293–301.
March, J., & Simon, H. (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley.
Miao, Y., Zeng, Y., & Lee, J. Y. (2016). Headquarters resource allocation for inter-subsidiary innovation
transfer: The effect of within-country and cross-country cultural differences. Management
International Review, 56(5), 665–698.
Minbaeva, D. B., & Michailova, S. (2004). Knowledge transfer and expatriation in multinational
corporations: the role of disseminative capacity. Employee Relations, 26(6), 663–679.
Minbaeva, D., Pedersen, T., Bjo¨rkman, I., Fey, C. F., & Park, H. J. (2003). MNC knowledge transfer,
subsidiary absorptive capacity, and HRM. Journal of International Business Studies, 34(6),
586–599.
Nelson, R., & Winter, S. (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Nonaka, I. (1994). A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. Organization Science, 5(1),
14–37.
O’Donnell, S. W. (2000). Managing foreign subsidiaries: Agents of headquarters, or an interdependent
network? Strategic Management Journal, 21(5), 525–548.
Patriotta, G., Castellano, A., & Wright, M. (2013). Coordination knowledge transfer: Global managers as
higher-level intermediaries. Journal of World Business, 28, 515–526.
Penrose, E. T. (1959). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Pe´rez-Nordtvedt, L., Kedia, B. L., Datta, K. D., & Rasheed, A. A. (2008). Effectiveness and efficiency of
cross-border knowledge transfer: An empirical examination. Journal of Management Studies, 45(4),
714–744.
Pe´rez-Nordtvedt, L., Mukherjee, D., & Kedia, B. L. (2015). Cross-border learning, technological
turbulence and firm performance. Management International Review, 55(1), 23–51.
Persson, M. (2006). The impact of operational structure, lateral integrative mechanisms and control
mechanisms on intra-MNE knowledge transfer. International Business Review, 15(5), 547–569.
Piekkari, R., Nell, P., & Ghauri, P. (2010). Regional management as a system: A longitudinal case study.
Management International Review, 50(4), 513–532.
Podsakoff, P. M., & Organ, D. (1986). Self-reports in organizational research: problems and prospects.
Journal of Management, 12(4), 531–544.
Poppo, L. (2003). The visible hands of hierarchy within the M-Form: An empirical test of corporate
parenting of internal product exchanges. Journal of Management Studies, 40(2), 403–430.
Postrel, S. (2002). Islands of shared knowledge: Specialization and mutual understanding in problem-
solving teams. Organization Science, 13(3), 303–320.
Raab, K. J., Ambos, B., & Tallman, S. (2014). Strong or invisible hands? Managerial involvement in the
knowledge sharing process of globally dispersed knowledge groups. Journal of World Business,
49(1), 32–41.
Reed, R., & DeFillippi, R. J. (1990). Causal ambiguity, barriers to imitation, and sustainable competitive
advantage. Academy of Management Review, 15(1), 88–102.
Roth, K., Schweiger, D., & Morrison, A. J. (1991). Global strategy implementation at the business unit
level: Operational capabilities and administrative mechanisms. Journal of International Business
Studies, 22(3), 369–402.
Rousseau, D. M., & Parks, J. M. (1993). Contracts of individuals and organizations. Research in
organizational behaviour, 15, 1–43.
Rugman, A. M., & Verbeke, A. (2001). Subsidiary-specific advantages in multinational enterprises.
Strategic Management Journal, 22(3), 237–250.
Schulz, M. (2001). The uncertain relevance of newness: Organizational learning and knowledge flows.
Academy of Management Journal, 44(4), 661–681.
The Value-Adding Role of the Corporate Headquarters in…
123
Schulz, M. (2003). Pathway to relevance: Exploring inflows of knowledge into subunits of multinational
corporations. Organizational Science, 14(4), 440–459.
Simonin, B. L. (1999). Ambiguity and the process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances. Strategic
Management Journal, 20(7), 595–623.
Simonin, B. S. (2004). An empirical investigation of the process of knowledge transfer in international
strategic alliances. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(5), 407–427.
Spender, J. C. (1996). Making knowledge the basis of a dynamic theory of the firm. Strategic
Management Journal, 17(Winter Special Issue), 45–62.
Stewardt, W. H., Ruth, C. M., & Ledgerwoods, D. R. (2015). Do you know what I know? Intent to share
knowledge in the US and Ukraine. Management International Review, 55(6), 737–773.
Szulanski, G. (1996). Exploring internal stickiness: Impediments to the transfer of best practice within the
firm. Strategic Management Journal, 17(S2), 27–43.
Szulanski, G. (2000). The process of knowledge transfer: A diachronic analysis of stickiness.
Organisational Behavior and Human Decision Process, 82(1), 9–27.
Szulanski, G. (2003). Sticky Knowledge Barriers to Knowing in the Firm. Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications.
Szulanski, G., Cappetta, R., & Jensen, R. J. (2004). When and how trustworthiness matters: Knowledge
transfer and the moderating effect of casual ambiguity. Organization Science, 15(5), 600–613.
Tallman, S., & Koza, M. (2010). Keeping the global in mind: The evolution of the headquarters role in
global multi-business firms. Management International Review, 50(4), 433–448.
Teece, D. J. (1977). Technology transfer by multinational firms: The resource cost of transferring
technological know-how. The Economic Journal, 87(346), 242–261.
Teece, D. J. (1986). Profiting from technological innovation. Research Policy, 15(6), 285–305.
Tsoukas, H. (1996). The firm as a distributed knowledge system: a constructionist approach. Strategic
Management Journal, 17(S2), 11–25.
Vahlne, J. E., Schweizer, R., & Johanson, J. (2012). Overcoming the liability of outsidership—The
challenge of HQ of the global firm. Journal of International Management, 18(3), 224–232.
van Wijk, R., Jansen, J. P., & Lyles, M. A. (2008). Inter- and intra-organizational knowledge transfer: A
meta-analytic review and assessment of its antecedents and consequences. Journal of Management
Studies, 45(4), 830–853.
Verbeke, A., & Greidanus, N. S. (2009). The end of the opportunism vs trust debate: Bounded reliability
as a new envelope concept in research on MNE governance. Journal of International Business
Studies, 40(9), 1471–1495.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free
Press.
Williamson, D. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
Winter, S. G. (1987). Knowledge and competence as strategic assets. In D. Teece (Ed.), The Competitive
Challenge: Strategies for Industrial Innovation and Renewal (pp. 159–184). Cambridge: Ballinger.
Yamin, M., Tsai, H. S., & Holm, U. (2011). The performance effects of headquarters’ involvement in
lateral innovation transfers in multinational corporations. Management International Review, 51(2),
157–177.
Zahra, S. A., Ireland, R. D., & Hitt, M. A. (2000). International expansion by new venture firms:
International diversity, mode of market entry, technological learning, and performance. Academy of
Management Journal, 43(5), 925–950.
Zander, U., & Kogut, B. (1995). Knowledge and the speed of the transfer and imitation of organizational
capabilities: An empirical test. Organization Science, 6(1), 76–92.
C. Holmstro¨m Lind, O. H. Kang
123
